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Abstract 
This study introduces the measurement of environmental inefficiency from an economic 
perspective that integrates, in addition to marketed good outputs, the negative environmental 
externalities associated with bad outputs. We develop our proposal using the latest by-
production models that consider two separate and parallel technologies: a standard technology 
generating good outputs, and a polluting technology for the by-production of bad outputs 
(Murty et al., 2012). While research into environmental inefficiency incorporating undesirable 
or bad outputs from a technological perspective is well established, no attempts have been 
made to extend it to the economic sphere. Our model defines an economic inefficiency measure 
that accounts for suboptimal behavior in the form of foregone private revenue and social cost 
excess (environmental damage). We show that economic inefficiency can be consistently 
decomposed according to technical and allocative criteria, considering the two separate 
technologies and market prices, respectively. We illustrate the empirical implementation of our 
approach on a set of established and complementary models using a dataset on agriculture at 
the level of US states. 
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1. Introduction 
Measuring the environmental inefficiency of production units is an increasingly 
important topic of recent economic research. Environmental inefficiency assessment integrates 
marketed (desirable, intended, or good) outputs with negative environmental externalities into 
inefficiency modeling (the production of so-called undesirable, unintended, detrimental, or bad 
outputs). Such analysis is important from the perspective of sustainable production because it 
provides valuable insights for firms on how to adopt environmentally friendly strategies, and 
for policy makers to improve the design of pollutant-abatement instruments, accounting for 
environmental challenges. 
Since the seminal work of Pittman (1983), the literature on modeling production 
technologies that account for bad outputs has developed into two main frameworks: one 
involving parametric methods (such as stochastic frontier analysis, SFA; Aigner et al., 1977), 
and one based on nonparametric methods (such as data envelopment analysis, DEA; Charnes 
et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984). The present study relies on data envelopment techniques 
because they are flexible and do not impose restrictive assumptions on the parametric 
specification of the technology, nor on the distribution of environmental inefficiency.1 Using 
these alternative frameworks, many different approaches have been proposed to assess 
environmental efficiency of production units. Lauwers (2009) classified these approaches into 
three groups. The first group concerns environmentally adjusted production efficiency models, 
in which undesirable outputs are incorporated into the production technology. In general, two 
main branches of studies within this group can be distinguished: (i) treating bad outputs as 
strong (free) disposable inputs (Haynes et al., 1993; Hailu and Veeman, 2001)2 or (ii) treating 
bad outputs as weekly disposable outputs and assuming the null-jointness of both bad and good 
outputs (Färe et al., 1986; Färe et al., 1989).3 The second group of studies consists of frontier 
eco-efficiency models (Korhonen and Luptacik, 2004; Kuosmanen and Kortelainen, 2005), 
which do not follow axiomatic production efficiency frameworks, but relate aggregate 
ecological outcomes with economic outcomes only. In other words, eco-efficiency is measured 
either through minimization of environmental outcomes given economic outcomes (for 
                                                            
1 See Tyteca (1996) for an exposition of early models within the non-parametric approach based on the output, 
input, and hyperbolic distance functions, which were subsequently implemented in a parametric framework by 
Cuesta, Lovell, and Zofío (2009). 
2 Free disposability of inputs implies that a reduction (increase) in inputs cannot increase (decrease) the output. 
3 Weak disposability of bad outputs implies that their production can only be reduced at the expense of reducing 
other (good) outputs. Null-jointness implies that if zero bad outputs are produced, then zero good outputs are 
produced as well; that is, there is no “free-lunch” in desirable outputs.   
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example, value added) or the alternative maximization of economic outcomes given the 
environmental outcomes. The third group of studies is based on the introduction of the 
materials balance principle into production models (Lauwers and Van Huylenbroeck, 2003; 
Coelli et al., 2007). The materials balance principle states that flows into and out of the 
environment are equal, linking the raw materials used in the production system to outputs, both 
intended and residual ones.  
While these three groups of approaches are currently in use, their principles have been 
heavily debated. The branches of studies assuming bad outputs as free disposable inputs or 
weakly disposable outputs have confronted each other (see, for example, the discussion 
between Hailu and Veeman (2001), Färe and Grosskopf (2003) and Hailu (2003)). Further, the 
main criticisms of these studies are inconsistency with physical laws or violating the materials 
balance principle (Coelli et al., 2007; Murty et al., 2012). Eco-efficiency models have been 
criticized mainly for their incomplete characterization of the production process (Dakpo et al., 
2016). Finally, critics of the materials balance approach have noted that it does not specify how 
bad outputs are generated, focuses mainly on material inputs, and requires all variables to be 
measured in the same measurement unit (Førsund, 2009; Hoang and Rao, 2010; Murty et al., 
2012). As a result, many subsequent extensions, as well as empirical applications, have 
followed one of these three diverging approaches (see, for example, Reinhard et al., 2000; 
Mahlberg and Sahoo, 2001 for the first approach; Pérez Urdiales et al., 2016; Picazo-Tadeo et 
al., 2011 for the second approach; and Welch and Barnum, 2009; and Hampf and Rødseth, 
2015 for the third approach).    
Dakpo et al.’s (2016) recent survey of environmental efficiency studies extended the 
Lauwers (2009) classification into the fourth, most recent, category of by-production models, 
which are based on the idea of defining two subtechnologies in parallel: one that generates 
good outputs and a second that generates bad outputs. This approach was introduced by Murty 
et al. (2012) and, as a consistent and relatively new approach, its empirical applications are 
flourishing (e.g., Dakpo et al., 2017; Arjomandi et al., 2018; Ray et al., 2018) as are its 
extensions (e.g., Serra et al., 2014; Lozano, 2015; Dakpo, 2016; Førsund, 2018).  
Regardless the modeling approach under the four listed categories, a common feature 
of all previous studies is that they are only capable of measuring technical efficiency by 
focusing on the technological side of the production process, while neglecting the measurement 
of environmental efficiency from an economic perspective. The determination of economic 
efficiency is important from a managerial standpoint focused on market-oriented performance. 
Managers are interested in increasing performance not only in physical terms by taking 
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advantage of the best technology available, but also by realizing the economic gains associated 
with allocative efficiency improvements; that is, the choice of optimal output and input mixes, 
leading to either maximum profit, revenue, or minimum cost. In the current framework 
including undesirable outputs, economic efficiency not only relates to the private objectives 
listed above, but must be extended to the social cost associated to the by-production of 
undesirable outputs. Indeed, the economic damage associated with their production, 
represented by a social cost function, shows how their production is detrimental to the 
economy. Yet, the existing models fail to take this step forward and internalize the negative 
economic effects associated to their by-production. In other words, they only consider the 
technological side, while it still remains an externality from an economic perspective.  
This study enhances these models by introducing a measure of environmental economic 
inefficiency that includes undesirable outputs and implements them from theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. To fill in the gap in the literature we postulate a comprehensive 
framework that is consistent with the economic behavior of organizations in their attempt to 
maximize revenue, but also accounts for the environmental inefficiency that results from the 
failure to minimize the economic cost associated to environmental damage. This results in the 
definition of an “environmental profit function” that maximizes the difference between private 
(market) revenue less social (environmental) cost, using the prices of good and bad outputs.4 
Hence, we develop a framework that is capable of balancing private gains (revenue) and social 
losses (cost) into a measure of economic inefficiency that can be decomposed according to 
technical and allocative criteria. Furthermore, within our framework we show how to 
decompose overall profit inefficiency into desirable (marketed output) inefficiency, and eco-
damage inefficiency. 
In this regard, we define the DEA programs that allow the empirical implementation of 
our novel approach.5,6 Our point of departure is the by-production model introduced by Murty 
                                                            
4 The model can be easily enhanced to include the minimization of inputs cost, but instead we keep the definition 
of “environmental profit inefficiency” as a trade-off between private revenue and social cost.   
5 Brännlund et al. (1995) measured profit inefficiency under a quota system and the production of undesirable 
outputs by DEA models. However, they did not use prices for weighting the negative externalities and do not 
decompose profit inefficiency into its drivers, something that we will do in this paper. Additionally, we note that 
Pham and Zelenyuk (2018) defined revenue inefficiency in the banking industry accounting for nonperforming 
loans (NPLs), which are modeled as undesirable outputs under the approach of weak disposability. However, the 
model is internal to the firm (that is, private revenue), as it does not include environmental indicators, while they 
do not implement it empirically.  
6 Also, Coelli et al. (2007) used the materials balance approach to estimate both environmental efficiency and cost 
efficiency separately, but they did not relate them to estimate an overall measure of cost efficiency incorporating 
environmental factors. The studies of Welch and Barnum (2009), Nguyen et al. (2012) and Hoang and Alauddin 
(2012) are similar to that of Coelli et al. (2007). Although other studies invoke the concept of revenue inefficiency 
in the context of production with undesirable outputs, they do so for the purpose of estimating shadow prices 
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et al. (2012), as it represents the most recent extension of previous approaches and can arguably 
be seen as a generalization that, by considering two independent technologies for desirable and 
undesirable outputs, avoids some of their inconsistencies (namely, the multiplicity of optimal 
combinations of desirable and undesirable outputs for a given level of inputs, and erroneously 
signed marginal rates of transformation − shadow prices − between outputs and inputs). 
Nevertheless, our model could be easily particularized for previous approaches.7 We also 
consider recent qualifications of the original by-production model by Dakpo (2016) and 
Førsund (2018).8  
We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our newly developed methodology through 
an application to state-level data of the United States agricultural sector. Agriculture involves 
the production of not only good outputs such as primary food commodities, but also of bad 
outputs related with, for example, the need for fuel, the usage of pesticides, fertilizers and other 
agriculture chemicals, or the management of manure (Skinner et al., 1997; Reinhard et al., 
1999, 2000). Examples of bad outputs associated to these polluting inputs in agriculture are 
greenhouse gas emissions, pesticide and nitrogen leaching and runoff, risk to human health and 
fish from exposure to pesticides and fertilizers, etc. (see Ball et al., 2001; Kellog et al., 2002; 
Dakpo et al., 2017). In the empirical application we are capable of considering two of these 
bad outputs: CO2 emissions and pesticide exposures.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the by-
production models of technical inefficiency and introduces their mathematical underpinnings. 
The subsequent section develops our extension allowing the measurement of economic (profit) 
inefficiency. We then discuss our empirical application, briefly commenting the dataset and 
presenting the results. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.           
 
2. The by-production models 
 
Pitmann (1983) and Färe et al. (1986) initiated the asymmetric modeling of outputs 
when measuring efficiency depending on their nature, increasing those that are market-oriented 
                                                            
between good and bad outputs. Examples of such studies are Färe et al. (2005, 2006). In addition, productivity 
change analyses accounting for bad outputs have been also undertaken, but without considering the economic side 
(Ball et al., 2005).   
7 Details on the characteristics of the by-production approach are presented in the next section.  
8 Although we are aware of other methodological developments that rely on the by-production model, such as 
Serra et al. (2014) or Lozano (2015), we have not considered them since their general idea is to mix the by-
production approach with other efficiency frameworks, and not the modification of the model per se. Hence, if 
applied, their results would not be comparable to those of the original by-production model.    
6 
while reducing those that are detrimental to the environment. A key question is how to 
axiomatically model the production technology when calculating technical efficiency through 
distance functions. Most particularly, as commented in the introduction to this paper, should 
the axioms underlying the production technology reflect their strong or weak disposability, and 
eventually, be modeled as outputs or as if they were inputs? Among the existing approaches 
for dealing with undesirable outputs and efficiency, the by-production model introduced by 
Murty and Russell (2002) and Murty et al. (2012) is currently considered a preferred option 
(for applications in agriculture see, for example, Serra et al., 2014, and Dakpo et al., 2017).  
The by-production approach posits that complex production systems are made up of 
several independent processes (Frisch, 1965). In this model, the technology can be separated 
into sets of sub-technologies; one for the production of good outputs and one for the generation 
of bad outputs. The “global” technology implies interactions between several separate sub-
technologies. Førsund (2018) and Murty and Russell (2018) recently classified the by-
production approach among the multi-equation modeling approaches and argued that an 
important advantage of this approach is that it represents pollution-generating technologies by 
accounting for the Material Balance Principle, thereby satisfying the laws of thermodynamics. 
Additionally, as Murty et al. (2012) remarked, the by-production model avoids two 
inconsistencies of previous approaches. In particular, several technical efficiency combinations 
of good and bad outputs, with varying levels of bad output, could be possible when holding 
(polluting and non-polluting) input quantities fixed. However, in the absence of abatement 
activities implemented by the firm, this type of combination is contrary to the phenomenon of 
by-production, since by-production implies that, at fixed levels of inputs, there is only one level 
of pollution at the frontier of the production possibility set. Moreover, it is possible to observe 
a negative trade-off between the inputs associated with pollution, like fuel, and their associated 
bad output, such as CO2, which represents a clear inconsistency (more fuel but less CO2). These 
are the reasons why the by-production approach is utilized in the current study to introduce the 
concept of environmental economic inefficiency taking market prices into account.  
In order to briefly review the standard by-production approach, let us formally define 
 nx R  as a vector of inputs,  my R  as a vector of good outputs,  mz R  as a vector of 
pollutants, and let us assume that p  DMUs have been observed. Murty et al. (2012) presented 
their model by splitting the input vector into two groups: non-polluting inputs, 11  nx R  and 
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pollution-generating inputs, 22  nx R , with 1 2 n n n .9 The first set could comprise land, 
labor, and so on, while the second set, in the context of our empirical application on agriculture, 
consists of inputs like fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides, which produce certain pollutants as by-
products, such as CO2 emissions and pesticide exposures. In this way, the ‘global’ technology, 
denoted by T , is the intersection of two sub-technologies, 1T  and 2T . Whereas 1T  is the 
standard production technology with only good outputs, 2T  represents the production of bad 
outputs. In the model by Murty et al. (2012), both technologies are linked through the level of 
the polluting inputs.  
In the non-parametric framework of DEA, the two sub-technologies may be expressed 
mathematically under variable returns to scale (VRS) as: 
 
 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
, , , 0 : , , , 1, 0    
   
            
p p p p
d d d d d d d d
d d d d
T x x y z x x x x y y ,      (1) 
 2 1 2 2 2
1 1 1
, , , 0 : , , 1, 0 .   
  
          
p p p
d d d d d d
d d d
T x x y z x x z z                       (2) 
With 1 2 T T T .  
Note that the sub-technologies are defined with two different intensity variables:   and 
 . Additionally, as Murty et al. (2012) highlighted, 1T  satisfies the standard free-disposability 
property of inputs (pollutant and non-pollutant) and the good output. On the pollution side, the 
bad outputs satisfy the assumption of costly disposability, which implies the possibility of 
observing inefficiency in the generation of pollution. 
Regarding the measurement of technical efficiency, Murty et al. (2012) showed that 
some conventional approaches, like the hyperbolic and directional distance function defined 
on 1 2 T T T , are inadequate in the context of by-production. We use the term “output-
oriented” in this context because these distance functions measure efficiency with respect to 
both good and bad outputs simultaneously. In this way, the weakness is due to the fact that the 
two aforementioned measures use the same coefficient (decision variable) for determining 
efficiency both in 1T  for the good outputs and 2T  for the bad outputs. This implies that it is 
possible to reach the efficiency frontier for some of the sub-technologies, but the observation 
can fall short of achieving the frontier of the other one. For consistency, efficiency in the by-
                                                            
9 Ayres and Kneese (1969) proposed these two same groups when introducing the materials balance principle to 
economists. 
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production approach requires models that project the assessed observations onto both the 
efficient frontier of 1T  and the efficient frontier of 2T . 
The abovementioned drawbacks of standard approaches motivated Murty et al. (2012) 
to propose a different measure for dealing with good and bad outputs under by-production. For 
DMU0, this measure is good-output-specific and bad-output-specific, and is based on the index 
previously defined by Färe et al. (1985): 
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The optimal value of (3) coincides with the mean of the standard good-output-oriented 
efficiency and the environmental bad-output-oriented efficiency. Note also that the above 
model is separable. In this case, this means that the optimal value can be determined as the 
mean of a model that minimizes 
1
1 
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m j
jm
 on 1T  and a model that minimizes 
1
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m
k
km
 on 2T : 
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   (4) 
It is worth mentioning that the recent paper by Førsund (2018) argued that non-pollution 
causing inputs should also be included in technology 2T  given that substitution between the 
two groups of causing inputs can help mitigate the pollution. Dakpo et al. (2017) indicated that 
some additional constraints must be added to the by-production approach of Murty et al. (2012) 
in order to guarantee that the projection points for input dimensions are the same in 1T  and 2T
. In particular, the condition that should be incorporated to model (3) would be: 
1 1
, 
 
  p pd id d id
d d
x x i . Hereafter, we use MT  to denote the production possibility set defined 
as the intersection of 1T  and 2T  in (1) and (2), respectively, as a way of highlighting that the 
definition of this technology corresponds to the original proposal of Murty et al. (2012). In the 
same way, we use DT  to denote the production possibility set defined from the original by-
production approach but incorporating the constraints 
1 1
, 
 
  p pd id d id
d d
x x i , as pointed out 
by Dakpo et al. (2017). Finally, we will utilize MFT  to denote the production possibility set 
defined by Murty et al. (2012) but incorporating non-polluting inputs in technology 2T . 
Likewise, DFT  denotes the production possibility set à la Dakpo et al. (2017) but again 
considering non-polluting inputs in the definition of technology 2T . 
To introduce our economic inefficiency model we extend the state-of-the-art of by-
production approach (Murty et al. 2012, Dakpo et al. 2017 and Førsund, 2018) by incorporating 
information on market prices. To do that, we resort to duality theory following Chambers et al. 
(1998), and, more recently, Aparicio et al. (2015), Aparicio et al. (2016a), and Aparicio et al. 
(2016b). In particular, we recall relevant duality results concerning the directional distance 
function. Consequently, we start out by defining this type of measure from an output-oriented 
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perspective in the context of by-production. Under the viewpoint introduced by Murty et al. 
(2012), we need a measure that allows us to project the assessed observations onto the efficient 
frontiers of 1T  and 2T  simultaneously. In this way, the “by-production” directional output-
oriented distance function for the Murty et al. (2012) approach with directional vector 
 0 00, ,g y z  is defined as follows: 
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The exogenous coefficients 1 0   and 2 0  , 1 2 1   , are weights that are pre-
fixed by the corresponding decision maker (manager, politician, regulator, etc.) to reflect the 
relative importance of the standard (traditional) way of producing versus the new and clean 
paradigm for generating goods and services. Additionally, its linear dual is: 
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Finally, to complete this opening section, we recall the first additive measure and 
decomposition of economic inefficiency proposed in the literature. We refer to the Nerlovian 
profit inefficiency measure, which can be decomposed into technical inefficiency (the 
directional distance function) and a residual term interpreted as allocative inefficiency 
(Chambers et al., 1998). 
In the standard production context, considering private revenue and cost only, and given 
a vector of input and output prices  ,  m sw p R  and technology T , the profit function   is 
defined as    , 1 1, max : , . 
       
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w p p y w x x y T  Profit inefficiency à la Nerlove for 
DMU0 is defined as optimal profit (that is, the value of the profit function at market prices) 
minus observed profit, both normalized by the value of a reference vector  ,  x y m sg g g R
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W P p y w x
p g w g
. Additionally, Chambers et al. (1998) showed that profit 
inefficiency may be decomposed into technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency, where 
12 
technical inefficiency corresponds to the directional distance function 
   0 0 0 0, ; , max : ( , )      x y x yTD x y g g x g y g T : 
     0 01 1 0 0 0 0
1 1
,
, ; , , ; , ; , 
 
       

 
 

s m
T r r i i
r i x y N x y
T Ts m
y x
r r i i
r i
w p p y w x
D x y g g AI x y w p g g
p g w g
 (7)
 
3. Measuring economic inefficiency with by-production models in DEA 
 
3.1. Economic inefficiency model considering Murty et al.’s (2012) technology 
We will first introduce some notation and definitions. Given a fixed level of input 
 0 10 0,...,   nnx x x R  and a fixed level of bad output  0 10 0,...,    mmz z z R , let us also define 
as  0 0, , ,r x z q T  the maximum feasible revenue given the output price vector 
 1,...,   mmq q q R : 
     0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2
1 1
, , , sup : , , sup : , , .
 
                
m m
r r r r
y yr r
r x z q T q y x y z T T T q y x y z T T (8) 
  Under Murty et al.’s (2012) approach, this optimization problem can be always solved 
independently on 1T  and 2T . Therefore, as for 1T , maximum feasible revenue given the output 
price vector  1,...,   mmq q q R  may be determined by: 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1
, , , sup : , , sup : , ,
 
             
m m
M M
r r r r
y yr r
r x z q T q y x y z T q y x y z T .          (9) 
Next, we explicitly show how the value of  0 0, , , Mr x z q T  can be calculated in DEA 
under the by-production framework (see Ray, 2004): 
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 0 0 , 1
0 1
1
0 1 2
1
1
1
, , , max
. . , 1,..., (10.1)
, 1,..., (10.2)
0, 1,..., (10.3)
1, (10.4)
0, 1,..., (10.5)
0, 1,..., (10.6)












 
  
   

 
 





s
M
r ry r
p
j ij i
j
p
j ij i
j
p
j rj r
j
p
j
j
j
r
r x z q T q y
s t x x i n
x x i n n
y y r m
j p
y r m
   (10)
The dual program of (10) is (11): 10 
1 2
1
1 2
1
0 0, , 1 1
1 1 1
min
. .
0, 1,..., (11.1)
, 1,..., (11.2)
0 (11.3)
 

  
   
  
    
 

 
  
n n
i i i ic d i i n
n n m
i ij i ij r jr
i i n r
r r
i
c x c x
s t
c x c x d y j p
d q r m
c
 
 
 
 
 
 (11) 
 
 
To evaluate economic loss due to revenue inefficiency, in the context of the directional 
output distance functions, Färe and Primont (2006) proved that a normalized measure of 
revenue inefficiency, in particular the ratio 
 0 0
1
1
, ,
,



m
r r
r
m
r r
r
r x q T q y
q g
 may be decomposed into 
technical inefficiency,  0 0, ;oD x y g , plus a residual term interpreted as allocative inefficiency 
in the Farrell tradition, where  0 , ,r x q T  and  0 0, ;oD x y g  denote the ‘standard’ revenue 
function and directional output distance function, respectively, and g  is the corresponding 
reference directional vector. 
                                                            
10 Actually, the dual program of model (10) has an additional set of non-negativity constraints for the decision 
variables rd , 1,...,r m . However, this set of constraints is redundant if we consider (11.2) and 0rq , 
1,...,r m . 
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Likewise, we can introduce cost efficiency following the same rationale, and based on 
the cost function. However, in our context we are interested in “social/environmental” cost 
functions rather than private costs, representing a measure of the (monetary) minimal damage 
caused by the production of undesirable outputs. The cost function represents a “monetized 
metric” of the ecological footprint such as the social cost of carbon (SCC); for example, the 
damage per ton of CO2 (see Pearce et al., 1996). Correspondingly, an observation is 
economically inefficient in environmental terms if, given the amount of undesirable outputs 
produced, it causes larger damage than that represented by the minimum 
“social/environmental” cost function (either as a result of technical or allocative inefficiencies). 
Let us assume that it is possible to observe or estimate prices for the undesirable outputs: 
 1,...,   mmw w w R . Under Murty et al.’s (2012) approach, the eco-damage function will be 
non-parametrically determined directly from 2T  as follows. 
 0 0 , 1
0 1 2
1
1
1
, , , min
. .
, 1,..., (12.1)
0, 1,..., (12.2)
1, (12.3)
0, 1,..., (12.4)
0, 1,..., (12.5)











  
   

 
 




m
M
k rz k
p
j ij i
j
p
j kj k
j
p
j
j
j
k
D x y w T w z
s t
x x i n n
z z k m
j p
z k m
  (12)
 
The dual program of (12) is (13): 
2
1
2
1
0 0 0, , 1
0 0 0
1 1
0
0 0
max
. .
0, 1,..., (13.1)
, 1,..., (13.2)
, 0 (13.3)
 

 

  

   
 


 
n
i ie f i n
n m
i ij k kj
i n k
k k
i k
e x
s t
e x f z j p
f w r m
e f
 (13)
 
We now derive, by duality, a normalized measure of economic inefficiency and show 
how it can be decomposed into (desirable) revenue inefficiency and eco-damage inefficiency. 
In order to do that, we first prove the following technical proposition. 
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Proposition 1. Let 1 T , 2 0 T . Then, 
   
 
2
1 2
00
11
0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 1
0 0 0
inf , , , , , , : min , 1
, , ; .
 



 
                     
 
 

mm
k kr rm m
TM M kr
r r k r T Tt h r k
M
h zt y
r x z t T t y h z D x y h T
x y z T
 
Proof. Let 0  nx R , 0  my R , 0  mz R  and let  mt R ,  mh R  such that 
1 2
00
11min , 1 


        
 mm k kr r
kr
T T
h zt y
. Let  * * *0 0 0, ,c d  be an optimal solution of (11) and let  * * *0 0 0, , e f  
be an optimal solution of (13) when 0  nx R , 0  my R , 0  mz R  and  mt R  (acting as q ), 

 mh R  (acting as w ) are taken as arguments. We will prove that 
   1 1 1 2 2 2 * * * *0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, , , , , , , , , ,   v u v u c t e h  is a feasible solution of (6). Constraints (6.5) and 
(6.6) are trivially satisfied. Regarding (6.1), 
1 2
1
* * *
0 0 0
by (11.2)1 1 1

   
     n n mi ij i ij r rj
i i n r
c x c x t y

1 2
1
* * * *
0 0 0 0
by (11.1)1 1 1
0
   
     n n mi ij i ij r rj
i i n r
c x c x d y . As for (6.2), 
1
0
1 1
 
m r r
r
T
t y
 since 
1 1 2
00 0
11 1min , 1  

 
        
  mm m k kr r r r
kr r
T T T
h zt y t y
. Therefore, 10
1


m Tr r
r
t y . In the same way, it is 
possible to prove that (6.3) and (6.4) are also satisfied. In particular, constraint (6.3) holds by 
(13.1) and (13.2). Consequently,  * * * *0 0 0 0, , , , , c t e h  is a feasible solution of   (6). Regarding 
the objective function of (6) evaluated at this point,  0 0 0, , ; Mx y z T   
1 2
1
* *
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1   
   n n mi i i i r r
i i n r
c x c x t y  + 2
1
* * *
0 0 0 0 0
1 1
 
  
   n mi i k k
i n k
e x h z  = 
   0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1
, , , , , ,

 
   m mM Mr r k r
r k
r x z t T t y h z D x y h T , since models (10) and (11) have the 
same optimal value and models (12) and (13) also have the same optimal value. In this way, 
 0 0 0, , ; Mx y z T  is a lower bound of the set 
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       1 2 2
1 1
* * * *
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1

     
       
n n nm
i i i i r r i i
i i n r i n
c t x c t x t y t e h x  +    *0 0 0
1
: ,

   
m
k k
k
h z h t h S , 
where       * * *0 0 0, ,c t d t t  is any optimal solution of (11) when q t ,  
      * * *0 0 0, ,e h f h h  is any optimal solution of (13) when w h , and 
       1 2 2
1 1
* * * *
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1

     
       
n n nm
i i i i r r i i
i i n r i n
c t x c t x t y t e h x +    *0 0 0
1
: ,

   
m
k k
k
h z h t h S
     0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1
, , , , , , :

 
     
m m
M M
r r k r
r k
r x z t T t y h z D x y h T   0, t h S , with 
  1 2
00
11
0 , : min , 1 

 

                    
 mm k kr r
m m kr
T T
w zq y
S q w R .  Now, given that the infimum of a set is 
the greatest lower bound of that set, we see that 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 1inf , , , , , , : , , , ; ,

 
         
m mM M M
r r k rt h r k
r x z t T t y h z D x y h T t h S x y z T  
which is the inequality that we were seeking. ■ 
Let  ,  m mq w R  be market prices for good and bad outputs, respectively. Then, 
   
1 2
0
00
11
,,
min , 


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 
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q w
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   1 2
00
11, : min , 1 

 

                    
 mm k kr r
m m kr
T T
w zq y
q w R .   
Consequently, applying Proposition 1, we get  
   
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 
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 1 1
0 0 0
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inf , , , , , , : ,
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   
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 
 
 
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m m
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r r k r
r k
m m
M M
r r k rt h r k
M
r x z q T q y w z D x y w T
r x z t T t y h z D x y h T q h S
x y z T
    (14) 
Finally, given that  0 0, , , Mr x z t T  is a function homogeneous of degree +1 in t  and 
 0 0, , , MD x y h T  is a function homogeneous of degree +1 in h , then 
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          (15) 
Note that the left-hand side of (15) may be interpreted as a (normalized) measure of 
economic environmental inefficiency. Additionally, following Farrell’s tradition, the right-
hand side can be interpreted as (environmental) technical inefficiency and the residual term 
associated with closing the inequality could be interpreted as allocative inefficiency. Moreover, 
it is possible to decompose the left-hand side of (15) into 
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However, note that the normalization term used in (15) and (16) − that is,
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11min , 
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 mm k kr r
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T T
w zq y
 − depends on two different terms, in contrast to what happens with 
respect to the Nerlovian profit inefficiency measure in (7). By analogy with the standard 
approach based on the directional distance function, we suggest resorting to an endogenous 
value for 1 T  and, therefore, also for 2 11  T T , such that 
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. It is easy to 
check that this value is 1* 0 0 0
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3.2. Economic inefficiency model considering Dakpo et al.’s (2012) approach 
We now turn to Dakpo et al.’s (2017) approach. In this case, the projection points in the 
two subtechnologies for the input dimensions must coincide. The “by-production” directional 
output distance function under the Dakpo et al. approach is as follows: 11 
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Its linear dual is: 
                                                            
11 Constraints (17.2) and (17.5) imply that 0 0
1 1
0 
 
   p pj ij j ij
j j
x x , for all 1 21,..., i n n . This inequality, 
together with (17.8), implies 0 0
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 
 
 p pj ij j ij
j j
x x  for all 1 21,..., i n n , which coincides with the constraint 
related to Dakpo et al.’s (2017) approach. We prefer to include (17.8) instead of 0 0
1 1
 
 
 p pj ij j ij
j j
x x , for all 
1 21,..., i n n , because, in this way, the corresponding dual decision variables in model (16) are directly non-
negative. 
19 
 
1 2
1
2
1
1 2
1
2
1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1
0 0 0
2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0
1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 1
0
1
1
0 0
1
, , ; min
. . (18.1)
0, 1,...,
n n m
i i i i r r
i i n rD
n m
i i k k
i n k
n n m
i ij i ij r rj
i i n r
n
i ij
i n
m
r r
r
v x v x u y
x y z T
v x u z
s t v x v x u y
x j p
u y





   

  
   
 

   
 
  
   
  

  
 
  



1
2 2
1 1
2
2 2 2
0 0 0 0
1 1 1
2
0 0
1
1 2 1 2
0 0 0 0 0
1 2
0 0
, (18.2)
0, 1,..., (18.3)
, (18.4)
, , , , 0, (18.5)
, free. (18.6)
T
n nm
i ij k kj i ij
i n k i n
m
T
k k
k
i i r k i
v x u z x j p
u z
v v u u
 


 

    


     


  

 
    (18)
In this context we now define a new support function, representing profit in Dakpo et 
al.’s model, as  0 , , , Dx q w T : 
 0
1 1
0 0 1
1
0 0 1 2
1
0
1
0
1
0 0 1 2
1
0
, , , max
. . , 1,..., (19.1)
, 1,..., (19.2)
0, 1,..., (19.3)
1, (19.4)
, 1,..., (19.5)







 






  
 
  
   

    
 





m m
D
r r k k
r k
p
j ij i
j
p
j ij i
j
p
j rj r
j
p
j
j
p
j ij i
j
j kj
j
x q w T q y w z
s t x x i n
x x i n n
y y r m
x x i n n
z
1
0
1
0, 1,..., (19.6)
1, (19.7)

  



p
k
p
j
j
z k m
 
(19)
 
20 
0 0 1 2
1 1
0 0
0, 1,..., (19.8)
, , , 0, (19.9)
 
 
 
    

 p pj ij j ij
j j
r k j j
x x i n n
y z
 
 
which maximizes the difference between private revenue and eco-damage costs in our by-
production context. 
The linear dual of (19) is: 
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Proposition 2. Let 1 T , 2 0 T . Then, 
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Proof. Following the same steps than in Proposition 1, we get the desired result. ■ 
Applying Proposition 2, with market prices  ,q w , we get the following inequality. 
   
1 2
0 0 0
1 1
0 0 0
00
11
, , ,
, , ;
min , 

 


              
 


m m
D
r r k k
r k D
mm
k kr r
kr
T T
x q w T q y w z
x y z T
w zq y
 .             (21) 
21 
 The left-hand side in (21) may be interpreted as a measure of economic environmental 
inefficiency, which could be decomposed into technical inefficiency (the right-hand side in 
(21)) and a residual term, interpreted as allocative inefficiency. 
 
3.3. Economic inefficiency model considering Førsund’s (2018) proposal  
Finally, it is possible to incorporate Førsund’s (2018) proposal, adapting Murty et al. 
(2012) and Dakpo et al. (2017). To do this, it is sufficient to include the non-polluting inputs 
in the subtechnology 2T . The results of Proposition 1 and 2 are valid for  0 0 0, , ; MFx y z T  and 
 0 0 0, , ; DFx y z T . Hence 
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The left-hand side may be interpreted as a measure of economic environmental 
inefficiency. In particular, it is possible to decompose it into 
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Regarding Dakpo et al.’s (2017) model, including Førsund’s (2018) extension, we have: 
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And 
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which results in the following inequality: 
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 Inequalities (24) and (28) make it possible to define technical and allocative terms as 
drivers of the corresponding measure of economic environmental inefficiency. In the empirical 
application we solve the models corresponding to Murty et al. (2012) and Dakpo et al. (2017), 
enhanced with Førsund’s (2018) proposal. This represents a total of four models. 
 
4. Empirical application 
 
4.1. Dataset and variables 
The empirical illustration relies on state-level data in the United States that comes from 
multiple agencies. The main source of data is the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 
Economic Research Service (ERS), which compiled the data necessary to calculate agricultural 
productivity in the US, and, in particular, the price indices and implicit quantities of farm 
outputs and inputs for each of the 48 continental states for 1960−2004. The dataset has been 
validated and used extensively in previous research (for example, in Ball et al., 1999; Zofío 
and Lovell, 2001; Huffman and Evenson, 2006; Sabasi and Shumway, 2018). A critical review 
of the data in light of recent developments can be found in Shumway et al. (2015; 2016). To 
illustrate our models, we consider the most recent year available in the dataset (2004) and 
assume that the production process is characterized by the following three non-polluting inputs 
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(capital services excluding land, land service flows, and labor services), two polluting inputs 
(energy and pesticides), and two good outputs (livestock and crops).12 All these variables are 
calculated as implicit (real) quantity indices, expressed in thousands of dollars, at constant 
prices of 1996, using the first state (Alabama) as reference benchmark. An index of relative 
real output (alternatively, real input) is obtained by dividing the nominal output (input) value 
ratio for the two states by the corresponding output (input) price index. The details on the 
method of construction of all variables are contained in the following webpage of USDA-ERS: 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-us/methods/. 
As for the undesirable output production generated by energy consumption, we consider 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the agricultural sector associated with fuel combustion, 
also for 2004 (expressed in tons of CO2 equivalents), obtained from the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Since these data are given in overall terms for the whole country, 
we further disaggregate it by state, using for that purpose the share that each state has in farm 
production expenses for gasoline, fuels, and oils, as reported by the US Department of 
Agriculture.13 The price of CO2 emissions is proxied by the market clearing price set in the 
state of California (price of carbon emissions expressed in thousands of dollars per ton of CO2 
equivalents), since a general market for CO2 for the whole US does not exist.14 In particular, 
this is the price of carbon for tradable allowances with a futures contract that originates from 
the Californian greenhouse gases trading market under the Cap and Trade Program. We 
consider the average 2012 price and deflate it to 2004 using the consumer price index in 
absence of a suitable deflator (US Bureau of Labor Statistics).15       
                                                            
12 The ERS dataset also contains data on one more output: other farm-related output. However, we do not take it 
into account since it is a residual to capture additional farm income and therefore usually consists of a very 
marginal fraction of the total farm output (rarely above 5 percent of the total farm output) and is therefore 
negligible. In addition, the ERS dataset provides the information on inputs of agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, 
and other intermediate inputs. Since we cannot relate these inputs with their associated bad outputs for which data 
are unavailable, we drop these inputs in our analysis.    
13 In particular, we use the data on expenses in gasoline, fuels and oils from the Census of Agriculture as reported 
by the US Department of Agriculture, expressed in thousands of dollars. Since the census was not conducted in 
2004, we take the average of the values reported for 2002 and 2007 censuses, which consists of the closest 
approximation of the 2004 data.   
14 On the contrary, a general US market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) has existed for many years (see 
https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/so2-allowance-auctions).   
15 California’s GHG emissions program is the second largest in the world after the European Union’s Emissions 
Trading System. From its beginning in 2012 it covered the power and industrial facilities, and it expanded to 
natural gas and transportation fuels in 2015, allowing it to cover approximately 85 percent of California’s GHG 
emissions. Another program exists in the US, called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), in which 
nine states participate. However, it is much narrower than the Californian program since it applies only to some 
power plants and only to CO2 emissions. Because of this, we decided to exclusively use the data from Californian 
program in our research. Also, mixing data on prices from both Californian and RGGI initiatives would not be 
appropriate since the two sets of values are incompatible.       
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The measure of bad output related to pesticides is the number of pesticide exposures 
per state for 2004 obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention at the US 
Department of Health & Human Services. As the approximation of the price of this bad output 
we use the cost of hospitalized treatment of pesticide-related poisonings (in thousands of 
dollars) as estimated in Pimentel (2005). Because this cost is provided for 1995, we further 
inflate it to 2004 prices using the price index for medical services as obtained from the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the descriptive statistics of input-output quantities and their 
corresponding prices, respectively, for the US states in 2004. Data in Table 1 indicates 
relatively large variations for input-output variables among states, as evidenced by large 
standard deviations with respect to their means, and resulting in relatively large coefficients of 
variation. Regarding the prices summarized in Table 2, smaller variation in the sample is 
generally observed. For both bad outputs (CO2 emissions and pesticide exposures), standard 
deviation is equal to 0 as we use a single price for all states. Obviously, there is some variability 
of these prices per state, but we are unable to capture that with the available data.           
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of input-output data (implicit real quantities), 2004. 
Variable Mean SD Coefficient of variation 
Non-pollution-generating inputs    
Capital services (thousand $) 541,067.83 450,804.23 0.83 
Land service flows (thousand $) 650,678.34 738,001.84 1.13 
Labor services (thousand $) 1,292,827.06 1,186,855.19 0.92 
Pollution-generating inputs    
Energy (thousand $) 166,646.86 144,483.99 0.87 
Pesticides (thousand $) 164,921.16 163,857.64 0.99 
Good outputs    
Livestock and products (thousand $) 2,103,075.52 1,997,443.05 0.95 
Crops (thousand $) 2,819,480.05 3,419,130.27 1.21 
Bad outputs    
CO2 emissions (tons of CO2 equivalents) 996,394.52 914,820.59 0.92 
Pesticide exposures (number) 2,458.71 2,256.45 0.92 
Notes: SD=Standard deviation.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of prices for input-output data, 2004. 
Variable Mean SD Coefficient of variation 
Non-pollution-generating inputs    
Capital services (indices relative to Alabama) 1.10 0.03 0.03 
Land service flows (indices relative to Alabama) 1.13 0.64 0.56 
Labor services (indices relative to Alabama) 1.16 0.32 0.28 
Pollution-generating inputs    
Energy (indices relative to Alabama) 1.44 0.17 0.12 
Pesticides (indices relative to Alabama) 1.14 0.25 0.22 
Good outputs    
Livestock and products  1.24 0.20 0.16 
Crops (indices relative to Alabama) 1.07 0.16 0.15 
Bad outputs    
CO2 emissions (thousand $ per ton of CO2 equivalents) 0.01 0 0 
Pesticide exposures (thousand $) 6.22 0 0 
Notes: SD=Standard deviation. Prices of inputs and good outputs vary across states and are expressed in relative 
terms with respect to the first state, Alabama, considering 1996 as the base year. Prices of bad outputs are unique 
for all states and are deflated to the 2004 reference year. 
 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Technical, allocative and profit frontiers.   
When solving our four reference economic models – that is, Murty et al. (2012) and 
Dakpo et al. (2017), each complemented with Førsund’s (2018) proposal − it is relevant to 
determine, from a technological perspective, the number of observations that are efficient, 
thereby defining the frontier of the global by-production technology T, consisting of both the 
intended production 1T  technology, (1) (hereafter, conventional or standard technology) and 
the pollution-generating technology 2T , (2) (hereafter, polluting technology). Table 3 shows 
that the number of observations defining the production frontier is greater in the conventional 
technology 1T  than in the polluting technology 2T , except in the case of the Murty et al. (2012) 
model incorporating Førsund’s proposal. Nevertheless, the number of observation jointly 
defining the by-production technology by being efficient in both 1T  and 2T  is greatly reduced. 
Interestingly, all states that are efficient according to Murty et al.’s model are also efficient in 
the other three models. These are California, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont, whose different production scales indicate that they represent alternative most 
productive scale sizes, serving as benchmark for the remaining states.      
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Table 3. Number of efficient US states.  
Model 
Technical 
Allocative Profit 
T 1T  2T  
Murty et al.  6 19 11 4 4 
Dakpo et al.  13 30 16 6 6 
Murty & Førsund 10 19 24 4 4 
Dakpo & Førsund 19 30 28 15 15 
 
Clearly, not all technically efficient states are allocative-efficient and thereby achieve 
profit efficiency. Again considering Murty et al.’s results, Delaware and Illinois fail to 
maximize profit at the existing input and output prices, which means they are allocative-
inefficient. Approximately 10 percent of US states (four or six out of 48) are fully efficient, 
except in Dakpo et al.’s approach, where the inclusion of the restriction ensuring that the 
optimal polluting inputs are quantitatively the same in 1T  and 2T , enhanced with the inclusion 
of non-polluting inputs in 2T  following Førsund, increases the number of profit-efficient states 
to 31.25 percent.    
4.2.2. Technical inefficiency: results within and between models 
Departing from this general portrait of inefficiency frequencies at the technical, 
allocative, and overall profit inefficiency levels, we now focus on the technological side, with 
Figure 1 portraying the average absolute technical efficiency values in 1T , 2T  and their global 
by-production aggregate T, across the four models (left panel).  
Several features are worth highlighting: 
i) Technical inefficiency in the conventional technology 1T  differs substantially on 
average between Murty et al.’s models (5) and (22), and Dakpo et al.’s models (17) and (26), 
but it is equal within each type of model. That is, as Førsund’s assumption includes non-
polluting inputs in 2T , the characterization of 1T  is the same and therefore remains unaffected 
by this assumption.  
ii) Average 1T  inefficiency in Murty et al.’s models is about 50 percent greater than Dakpo 
et al.’s models: 0.1814 vs. 0.1190. This result is also expected since the introduction of the 
additional constraint in Dakpo et al.’s models, ensuring that optimal polluting input quantities 
are the same in 1T  and 2T , results in a tighter envelopment of the observed data, and hence in 
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lower inefficiency values. Nevertheless, a 50 percent difference is quite remarkable from an 
empirical perspective. 
iii) Technical inefficiency in the residual (polluting) technology 2T  differs across the four 
models. However, while there are not significant differences between Murty et al.’s (5) and 
Dakpo (17) et al.’s models (0.1844 vs. 0.1632), what makes a difference is the introduction of 
Førsund’s proposal including non-polluting inputs in 2.T  Indeed, the average technical 
inefficiency in Murty et al.’s model (5) is three times greater than that for the same model 
enhanced with Førsund’s assumption (22): 0.1844 vs. 0.0659. The difference between Dakpo 
et al.’s model (17) and that enhanced with Førsund’s proposal (26) is similar to the difference 
above: 0.1632 vs. 0.0551. Thus, the inclusion of non-polluting outputs in 2T  − which partly 
results from the inclusion of the additional set of constraints − also has remarkable effects on 
reducing technical inefficiency. 
iv) Regarding the global by-production technical inefficiency T, its values closely follow 
those of the conventional technology 1T  as a result of the weighting scheme that, as long as the 
profit inefficiency normalizing constraint is the same for all observations, tends to favor a 
higher weight of 1 T . In the particular case of the current empirical application, based on US 
agriculture data, the 1 T  − as long as the condition 10
1
/ 

m Tr r
r
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1
/

m Tk k
k
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1 1
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 
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m m
T T
r r k k
r k
q y w z  is common to all 
states and models − corresponds to 1* T  0.99; see the denominator in expressions (15), (21), 
(24) and (28).16 
 
  
                                                            
16 We acknowledge that this practically implies a “business as usual” evaluation of technical inefficiency in the 
by-production model. However, our proposed model is general enough to accommodate other weights, as would 
be the case if other (subjective) weights were chosen, or in other applications where the difference in economic 
value between private revenue and social cost would not be that large (as could be seen if average private revenue 
and social cost were calculated using the mean quantity and price values presented in Table 1). One should keep 
in mind that our proposal to choose delta simply reflects the empirical balance between the former economic 
values (that is, private benefit and social cost), since a weight equal to 0.5 would simply imply that both monetary 
valuations are equal. 
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Figure 1. Average technical inefficiencies by models (absolute and percentage values). 
 
The correlations between the technical efficiency scores using Spearman’s definition 
show that the conventional and environmental efficiency performance are weakly or even 
negatively correlated in most cases (see Table 4). This should come as no surprise given that 
observations do have market incentives to perform better in the conventional side of the 
production process 1T  (that is, to maximize output revenue), but these incentives are weak or 
absent in the case of environmental cost minimization. Since the production of undesirables 
outputs (CO2 emissions and pesticide exposures) is not normally internalized by the economic 
system, productive efficiency in 2T  is not tightly pursued, which means that a negative 
correlation between both rankings is a likely outcome. This can be seen clearly in the 
unmodified Murty et al. and Dakpo et al. models, where 2T  inefficiencies are greater on 
average. Nevertheless, we note that the variability in the rankings is so high that none of these 
correlations are significant at the standard confidence levels. It is also worth remarking that the 
correlations between models’ rankings for the polluting technology 2T  are generally smaller 
than for the standard technology 1T  (except for the Murty et al. and Dakpo et al. models 
enhanced with Førsund’s proposal, whose correlation is  2 2 )M&F ,  D&F( T T  = 0.871).  
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Table 4. Spearman’s correlation matrix between technical inefficiencies. 
 
   Conventional technology ( 1T ) Polluting Technology ( 2T ) 
  Murty T1  
Dakpo 
T1 
M. & F. 
T1 
D. & F. 
T1 
Murty
T2 
Dakpo 
T2 
M. & F. 
T2  
D. & F. 
T2 
Co
nv
ent
ion
al  
tec
hn
olo
gy 
 
(T1
) 
Murty T1 1.000*        
Dakpo T1 0.764* 1.000*       
M. & F. T1 1.000* 0.764* 1.000*      
D. & F. T1 0.764* 1.000* 0.764* 1.0000*     
Po
llu
tin
g  
tec
hn
olo
gy
 
(T2
) 
Murty T2 -0.142ns 0.090ns -0.142ns 0.090ns 1.000*    
Dakpo T2 -0.079ns 0.108ns -0.080ns 0.108ns 0.901* 1.000*   
M. & F. T2 -0.132ns -0.133ns -0.132ns -0.133ns 0.557* 0.549* 1.000*  
D. & F. T2 0.012ns -0.006ns 0.012ns -0.006ns 0.430* 0.542* 0.871* 1.000*
Notes: Murty et al.: (5), Dakpo et al.: (17), Murty et al. & Førsund: (22), Dakpo et al. & Førsund: (26).   
           * p < 0.01; ns Non-significant at 10% level. 
 
Besides focusing on absolute values, we can gain information on the weight that each 
technology ( 1T  and 2T ) has on the by-production technology T. The right-hand panel of Figure 
1 shows the average percentage weight that each one of them has on the aggregate result. On 
average, for US agriculture, both 1T  and 2T  inefficiencies account for a significant share of 
aggregate by-production inefficiency, their values being driven by the large number of efficient 
observations in either technology, resulting in a null contribution to aggregate inefficiency, and 
explaining the relative balanced average percentage values for the four models, regardless of 
1 T . This is particularly the case for the Dakpo et al. approach, where 2T  technical inefficiency 
is rather large in absolute values. Nevertheless, since mean values provide only a rough first 
approximation to inefficiency results, we now study their different distributions.  
A visual comparison of the values of the technical inefficiency scores for 1T  and 2T  is 
presented in Figure 2, where box-plots of the different distributions make it possible to identify 
extreme values. The different boxes (grouped in pairs by models) represent the intervals 
between the first and third quartiles of the ranking distribution (that is, the interquantile range 
(IQR) between Q1 and Q3), with its median represented by the horizontal line within it (the 
median can then be compared to the mean values presented in Figure 1). The dispersion in the 
rankings within this interquartile range is relatively low, particularly for the polluting 
technologies 2T , incorporating Førsund’s assumption. It is also reassuring that only a few 
outliers were identified. In particular, for the Murty et al. model the states of Louisiana (0.994) 
and Montana (1.066) are the most inefficient, lying outside the area below the whisker equal 
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to one a half times the IQR. In Dakpo et al.’s model, Montana (0.970) is the worst-performing 
state. As for these extreme states, the ranking and values do not change when Førsund’s 
assumption is considered, suggesting robustness in the results. 
Still focusing on the box-plots, it is relevant to test whether the distributions of the 
conventional and polluting technologies, 1T  and 2T , are equal within each one of the four 
models. For this purpose, we have performed the test proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006). 
Their method adapts the nonparametric test for the equality of two densities developed by Li 
(1996). For this test we use algorithm II with 1000 replications, which computes the Li statistic 
on the bootstrapped estimates of the DEA scores, and where the null values of the efficient 
firms (resulting in the truncation of the efficiency scores) are smoothed by adding a small 
noise.17 The obtained results reject the null hypothesis of equality of densities for all models at 
the 5 percent level of significance, which means that 1T  and 2T  inefficiencies are statistically 
different in each of the four models.18  
Figure 2. Box plots of the technical inefficiency distributions by models. 
 
  Alternatively, it is also interesting to test if the 1T  and 2T  inefficiency distributions are 
different between models. Figure 3 depicts their kernel distributions in each one of the four 
models (left and right panels for 1T  and 2T , respectively). When plotting these distributions we 
follow the procedure proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), which in short: (i) uses Gaussian 
                                                            
17 Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) developed their algorithm for radial distance functions, in which the efficiency 
values equal to one are smoothed. We adapted their algorithm to our additive context by smoothing the 
inefficiency scores equal to zero.    
18 The level of significance changes to 1 percent when the hypothesis is tested for Dakpo et al.’s model enhanced 
with Førsund’s assumption. 
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kernels, (ii) employs the reflection method to overcome the issue of a zero-bounded support of 
the inefficiency scores (Silverman, 1986), and (iii) determines the bandwidths using Sheather 
and Jones’s (1991) method. As commented, 1T  distributions are the same across pairwise 
models; that is, Murty et al.’s model (5), and Dakpo et al.’s model (17), are equal to their 
respective Førsund’s extensions, (22) and (26) (that is, 1 1M M&FT T , 1 1D FD &T T ). When 
comparing Murty et al.’s and Dakpo et al.’s models ( 1MT  vs. 1DT ) and Murty et al.’s enhanced 
with Førsund’s assumption model and Dakpo et al.’s model ( 1M&FT vs. 1DT ), the null 
hypotheses of the equality of densities cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level, so these 
models are not statistically different. However, the comparison between Murty et al.’s and 
Dakpo et al.’s models, both enhanced with Førsund’s assumption ( 1M&FT  vs. 1D&FT ), and 
Murty et al.’s model and Dakpo et al.’s model enhanced with Førsund’s assumption ( 1MT  vs. 
1D&FT ), shows that the null hypotheses of equality of densities is rejected at the 5 percent and 
10 percent levels, respectively.     
 
Figure 3. Technical inefficiencies kernel distributions ( 1T  and 2T ) by models 
As for the differences in the polluting technology 2T  (right panel), the adapted Li test 
returns that the Murty et al.’s (5) and Dakpo et al.’s models (17) are not statistically different 
among themselves ( 2MT  vs. 2DT ); this result extends to their Førsund’s versions: (22) and (26) 
( 2M&FT  vs. 2D&FT ). However, when comparing Murty et al.’s model to its Førsund’s 
extension ( 2MT  vs. 2M&FT ), Dakpo et al.’s model to its Førsund’s extension ( 2DT  vs. 2D&FT
), Murty et al.’s model to Dakpo et al.’s in its Førsund’s version ( 2MT  vs. 2D&FT ), as well as 
Murty et al.’s in its Førsund’s version model to Dakpo et al.’s model ( 2M&FT vs. 2DT ), the 
results of the adapted Li test show that that null hypotheses of the equality of densities are 
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rejected at the 1 percent level. Detailed results on these bilateral tests for both 1T  and 2T  are 
presented in Appendix A.1. Therefore, as for technical inefficiencies, we can conclude that 1T  
and 2T  results are statistically different within models, but in many cases not between models. 
4.2.3. Profit inefficiency: technical and allocative inefficiencies between models 
We now discuss the economic efficiency dimension of the agricultural sector at the state 
level. The left-hand panel of Figure 4 portrays absolute average values of the profit, technical, 
and allocative inefficiencies of the four technological models. Average profit inefficiency is 
about 50 percent greater in Murty et al.’s model (15) than in Dakpo et al.’s model (21): 0.269 
vs. 0.176, respectively. Despite the different technological characterization of the polluting 
technology when incorporating Førsund’s extensions to the profit inefficiency definition, (25) 
and (28), the difference in results between the former and the latter models is marginal. 
Consequently, while the difference within each type of model is minimal (that is, MPI vs. 
M&FPI, and DPI vs. D&FPI), the differences between models remain the same at the 50 percent 
level. Regarding the difference between technical and allocative inefficiencies in absolute 
terms, the former doubles the latter in absolute terms on average.  
 
Figure 4. Average values of technical and allocative inefficiencies (AI and TI) by models. 
 
We have also calculated Spearman’s correlations between the different pairs of models. 
Table 5 reports the coefficients for the profit inefficiencies (PIs), allocative inefficiencies (AIs), 
and the aggregate by-production technical inefficiencies (TIs), thus complementing Table 4’s 
presentation of the correlations for the standard and polluting technologies, 1T  and 2T . The 
ranking correlation between Murty et al. and Dakpo et al.’s profit inefficiencies is rather high 
at  (MPI, DPI) = 0.705, similar to that between their Førsund extensions:  (M&FPI, D&FPI) = 
0.749. Nevertheless, the ranking compatibility is much greater within models. Indeed, the 
correlation between profit inefficiency defined under each type of technological model (either 
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à la Murty et al. or Dakpo et al.) and their corresponding Førsund variations is almost perfect 
at  (MPI, M&FPI) = 0.999 and  (DPI, D&FPI) = 0.969. Also, reading vertically the profit 
inefficiency columns (PIs) in Table 5, we learn that they correlate more with their technical 
inefficiencies components (TIs) than with their allocative inefficiencies (AIs), particularly for 
the Murty et al. models. 
 The magnitudes of these correlation coefficients extend to the aggregate by-production 
technical inefficiencies (TIs), as the correlation between the Murty et al. and Dakpo et al. 
models is  (MTI, DTI)  = 0.681, increasing to  (M&FTI, D&FTI) = 0.757 if their Førsund 
specifications are considered. Correlation increases again within models – that is, the 
coefficient for the Murty et al. model and its Førsund extension is  (MTI, M&FTI) = 0.983 − 
while that for the Dakpo et al. approach and Førsund extension is  (DTI, D&FTI) = 0.932. 
Similarly, the alternative allocative inefficiency rankings (AIs) present rather comparable 
results, both between and within models.  
Finally, as presented in the lower central panel of Table 5, technical and allocative 
inefficiencies correlate mildly, albeit positively. Particularly for the Dakpo et al. models:  
(DTI, DAI) = 0.777 and  (D&FTI, D&FAI) = 0.697. This suggests that the economic performance 
of US states from both technological and allocative perspectives go hand by hand. Indeed, as 
none of the coefficients are negative, it is possible to dismiss the idea that realized technological 
and allocative behavior follow opposite ways. This result is expected because profit 
inefficiency includes marketed outputs, and farms have an incentive to perform well 
technologically by attaining the maximum feasible quantities of desirable outputs given the 
technology (that is, livestock and crops), and also to choose their optimal relative quantities 
(output mix) in order to maximize revenue at market prices. On the contrary, although the 
social side of the profit inefficiency definition, represented by the environmental (monetary) 
cost damage, is less binding (to the extent that farmers do not explicitly aim to minimize CO2 
emissions and pesticide exposures, and therefore their social cost), its economic values are 
notably smaller than their marketed private revenue counterparts. Hence the technical and 
allocative efficiency levels correlate positively, as they are both dominated by the private side 
of economic performance, actively pursued by the economic agents. We also stress that, in this 
case, most of the correlations are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, particularly 
within models. 
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Table 5. Spearman’s correlation matrix between profit inefficiencies (PI, TI and AI) 
  Profit inefficiency (PI) Technical inefficiency (TI)  Allocative inefficiency (AIs) 
  Murty 
PI 
Dakpo 
PI 
M. & F. 
PI 
D. & F. 
PI 
Murty 
TI 
Dakpo 
TI 
M. & F. 
TI 
D. & F. 
TI 
Murty 
AI 
Dakpo 
AI 
M. & F. 
AI 
D. & F. 
AI 
P
r
o
f
i
t
 
I
n
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
(
P
I
)
 
Murty PI 1.000*            
Dakpo PI 0.705* 1.000*           
M. & F. PI 0.999* 0.700* 1.000*          
D. & F. PI 0.749* 0.969* 0.749* 1.000*         
T
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
 
I
n
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
(
T
I
)
 
Murty TI 0.900* 0.677* 0.900* 0.702* 1.000*        
Dakpo TI 0.625* 0.945* 0.620* 0.893* 0.681* 1.000*       
M. & F. TI 0.896* 0.665* 0.899* 0.722* 0.983* 0.657* 1.000*      
D. & F. TI 0.684* 0.881* 0.683* 0.907* 0.740* 0.932* 0.757* 1.000*     
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
v
e
 
I
n
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
(
A
I
)
 
Murty AI 0.648* 0.416* 0.648* 0.452* 0.397* 0.265** 0.392* 0.280** 1.000*    
Dakpo AI 0.585* 0.898* 0.580* 0.869* 0.500* 0.777* 0.491* 0.696* 0.579* 1.000   
M. & F. AI 0.639* 0.409* 0.639* 0.449* 0.390* 0.258** 0.386 0.278** 0.998* 0.579* 1.000*  
D. & F. AI 0.592* 0.842* 0.593* 0.875* 0.489* 0.702* 0.512 0.697 0.624* 0.963* 0.630* 1.000*
    Notes: Murty et al.: (15), Dakpo et al.: (21), Murty et al. & Førsund: (25), Dakpo et al & Førsund: (28).   
   * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.1 
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Also, since profit efficiency is the aggregate resulting from adding technical and 
allocative inefficiencies (PI = TI + AI), it is relevant to highlight its sources in percentage 
terms. The left-hand panel in Figure 4 shows that, on average, TI doubles AI in value. 
Specifically, in the model characterizing the technology following Murty et al., average 
TI amounts to 0.182, while AI amounts to 0.087. This 50 percent difference is also 
observed for the economic model based on Dakpo et al.’s technological characterization: 
0.119 vs. 0.056. The same holds for the difference between both types of models 
assuming the Førsund extension in the polluting technology. However, once the 
percentage shares of the technical and allocative inefficiencies have been calculated at 
the individual state level, and the results averaged, the right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows 
a balanced picture, with both sources of inefficiency weighting about 50 percent each. 
This suggests that the individual distributions of technical and allocative inefficiencies 
exhibit relatively large dispersions.  
For this reason, we study the characteristics of these distributions by resorting to 
their box-plot representations. One can corroborate the differences between Murty et al.’s 
and Dakpo et al.’s models, and the similarities within the same type of model when 
comparing the former to their Førsund extensions. Focusing initially on the three US 
states with the worst economic performance, lying above one and half times the 
interquantile range (IQR) of Murty et al.’s model, Montana presents a profit inefficiency 
value of 1.545 (five times greater than the mean at 0.260), resulting from the addition of 
technical inefficiency, 1.066 (whose mean value is 0.182), and allocative inefficiency, 
0.479 (0.087). The second and third worst-performing states are North Dakota (1.285 = 
0.511 + 0.774) and Louisiana (1.071 = 0.994 + 0.077), respectively. These results 
illustrate the high variability in the relative values of the technical and allocative 
components of overall profit inefficiency across the sample. Nevertheless, it is observed 
that the IQR for allocative inefficiency, AI AI3 3Q -Q  = 0.104, is about half of that observed 
for technical inefficiency, TI TI3 3Q -Q  = 0.284. As for the worst-performing states outside 
one and a half times the IQR in the Dakpo et al. model, only one (Montana again) incurs 
the highest profit inefficiency (1.545 = 0.970 + 0.575); in this case, about nine times 
greater than the profit inefficiency mean at 0.167. A similar gap between the technical 
and allocative IQRs can also be observed in this model. We do not comment further on 
the results of each type of model enhanced with Førsund’s proposal since they closely 
follow those already presented.  
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Figure 5. Box plots of the profit inefficiency distributions by models. 
 
   We conclude the empirical section by checking whether these distributions are 
statistically different. As before, we first test whether the technical and allocative 
efficiencies components of profit inefficiency are different from each other within the 
same model (MTI vs. MAI, DTI vs. DAI, etc.) following the method proposed by Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2006). In all models except Dakpo et al.’s, the null hypothesis testing the 
equality of the densities cannot be rejected, even at the 10 percent level of significance. 
Hence, technical and allocative inefficiencies are not statistically different in the three 
models. This can be visually corroborated by comparing the TI and AI distributions in 
the box-plots corresponding to each model in Figure 5, or comparing the technical and 
allocative distributions presented in the left and central panels of Figure 6.   
As for the differences in profit, technical and allocative inefficiencies between 
models (M vs. D, M vs. M&F, etc.), the test of Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) returns varied 
results on the (in)existence of statistical differences between these distributions, which 
can be visually anticipated in Figure 6. The comparison of profit, technical, and allocative 
inefficiencies for Murty et al.’s model with Dakpo et al.’s model reveals significant 
differences between them (depending on the models being compared at the 5 percent or 
10 percent level of significance) (MPI vs. DPI, MTI vs. DTI, and MAI vs. DAI); this result 
extends to their Førsund’s versions (M&FPI vs. D&FPI, M&FTI vs. D&FTI, and M&FAI vs. 
D&FAI). Hence we conclude that the choice of model is not neutral when comparing 
economic performance across states. On the contrary, it turns out that these distributions 
are the same for Murty et al.’s model and its counterpart extended with Førsund 
39 
assumption (MPI vs. M&FPI), as well as for Dakpo et al.’s model and its Førsund extension 
(DPI vs. D&FPI). This is also a remarkable result, implying that, for the whole US 
agricultural sector, profit inefficiency, including its technical and allocative terms, can be 
equally measured irrespective of whether the global underlying production technology T 
incorporates Førsund’s proposal or not. The detailed results on the test for profit, 
technical, and allocative inefficiencies are presented in Appendix A.2.  
Finally, Map 1 illustrates the profit, technical, and allocative inefficiency results 
for all 48 states in the sample. As all four models are equally representative, we map the 
results of the economic model characterizing the global technology following Murty et 
al. (2012). We visually confirm the existence of several geographical clusters, particularly 
of large profit inefficiencies in the Pacific Northwest states of Washington, Oregon, 
Montana, and the Dakotas. This suggests that the agricultural characteristics of their 
production processes, mainly focused in livestock production, along with market prices, 
are hampering their economic performance. On the contrary, we could not observe a 
significant clustering of the economically efficient states: California, Delaware, Iowa and 
Vermont. While there seems to be visual evidence calling for the application of spatial 
regression analyses on the inefficiency results, as well as their explanation in terms of the 
technological specialization and market orientation of the different states, these 
extensions fall beyond the scope of the current application, which is intended to illustrate 
the new economic models.  
 
40 
Fig
ure
 6.
 Pr
ofi
t in
eff
icie
ncy
 ke
rne
l d
istr
ibu
tio
ns 
(PI
, T
I a
nd
 AI
). M
ap 
1. P
rof
it I
nef
fic
ien
cy:
 M
urt
y e
t al
.´s 
(20
12)
 m
od
el. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
020406080
0
.5
1
TI
MU
RT
Y
DA
KP
O
M.
 & 
FO
RS
UN
D
D.
 & 
FO
RS
UN
D
41 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper introduces the theory and practice of environmental economic 
inefficiency measurement. Environmental economic inefficiency represents the ability of 
firms to maximize the difference between private revenue and “social/environmental” 
cost given the production technology and market prices. This objective can be likened to 
a “profit” function that economically weighs private gains and social losses by 
internalizing the damage associated with the production of undesirable outputs. Resorting 
to duality theory enabled us to demonstrate how this (supporting) economic function 
relates to a technical counterpart represented by the directional distance function, 
effectively extending the analytical framework of Chamber et al. (1998) to the field of 
environmental economics. Since the directional distance function can be regarded a 
measure of technical efficiency, the gap between technical and optimal economic 
performance can be attributed to allocative inefficiencies. Hence, profit inefficiency can 
be consistently decomposed into its technical and allocative sources.  
The new model departs from one of the most recent proposals characterizing the 
production technology in the presence of undesirable outputs; the so-called by-production 
model put forward by Murty et al. (2012). This analytical framework differentiates 
between two separate sub-technologies, one corresponding to the conventional (privately 
oriented) approach and one characterizing the production of pollutants only. Our model 
makes it possible to assign different weights to each technology in order to account for 
the modeler or stakeholder preferences (managerial, political, legal/regulatory, etc.). 
Although the new economic model could be developed adopting other technological 
characterizations, the by-production approach overcomes prior limitations and is 
becoming increasingly popular among practitioners. Moreover, it is subject to continuous 
qualifications such as those recently introduced by Dakpo et al. (2017) and Førsund 
(2018). 
We develop our new model within the data envelopment analysis framework, 
which allows us to illustrate its empirical viability using a real-life data set on US 
agriculture for 2004. The production technology is characterized by five inputs − capital, 
land, labor, energy, and pesticide (the latter two of which are polluting inputs) − and two 
outputs: livestock and crops. We implement four models corresponding to the original 
proposal by Murty et al. (2012), a modified version corresponding to Dakpo et al.’s (2017) 
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qualification that ensures that the projections points for input dimensions are the same in  
the conventional and polluting technologies, and their corresponding modifications that 
incorporate Førsund’s (2018) proposal of bringing non-contaminating inputs into the 
polluting technology, so as to allow for substitution effects. The main empirical findings 
are the following:    
 Technical inefficiencies between the Murty et al. and Dakpo et al. models do not 
generally differ in the case of the conventional technology, either looking at 
Spearman’s correlations or Li tests. On the contrary, although they also yield similar 
results regarding the polluting technology, they differ statistically from their Førsund 
extensions. We confirm that technical inefficiencies in the conventional and 
environmental technologies are unrelated, with the latter being larger than the former. 
This simply reflects the fact that farmers do not have market incentives to perform 
better in the environmental side of the production process (that is, reducing social 
costs), as opposed to the conventional side, where falling short from the production 
frontier results in lower (private) revenue. In passing, we note that these empirical 
results comparing technical efficiencies for alternative models are novel, since they 
had not been confronted until now. 
 As for the new economic inefficiency framework, statistical differences can be found 
across the alternative models. Profit inefficiency is generally larger in Murty et al.’s 
model than in Dakpo et al.’s. This result extends to their technical and allocative 
components. Our results show that technical inefficiency is generally larger than 
allocative inefficiency, suggesting that there is more room for economic 
improvements by taking advantage of the existing technology than by reallocating the 
relative demand for inputs and outputs given their market prices (that is, the relative 
specialization in input usage and output production). As for the extension of these two 
models with Førsund’s proposal, no statistically significant differences emerge.   
We conclude from these results that, as expected, the analytical approach chosen 
to evaluate environmental economic efficiency is highly dependent on the technological 
model upon which it is based. Choosing alternative models leads to significant differences 
in the magnitude of technical and allocative inefficiency, which may question the 
credibility of results given their lack of robustness, and lead to contradictions and faulty 
managerial and policy decision making. Therefore, caution should be exerted when 
implementing the new analytical framework, which nevertheless opens the door to a 
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whole new range of models capable of internalizing the social cost of environmental 
damage when assessing economic performance. This is a key extension in the 
measurement of environmental efficiency that was not available until now.      
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Appendix A.1. Results of Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li test (test statistic and 
significance level) for T1 and T2 
Conventional technology (T1) 
 Murty Dakpo M. & F. D. & F.  
Murty  - 4.91 -1.05   7.07* 
Dakpo   - 5.14 -1.11 
M. & F.    -     7.40**
D. & F.     - 
Polluting Technology (T2) 
 Murty Dakpo   M. & F. D. & F.   
Murty  - -0.58 17.01***18.53***
Dakpo   - 10.81***11.82***
 M. & F.          -  -1.04 
 D. & F.         - 
Notes: Murty et al.: (5), Dakpo et al.: (17), Murty et al. & Førsund: (22), Dakpo et al. & Førsund: (26).   
*** Denotes statistically significant differences between models at the critical 1 percent level. 
** Denotes statistically significant differences between models at the critical 5 percent level. 
* Denotes statistically significant differences between models at the critical 10 percent level. 
 
Appendix A.2. Results of Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapted Li test (test statistic and 
significance level) for profit, technical and allocative inefficiencies 
Profit inefficiency (PI) 
 Murty Dakpo M. & F. D. & F.  
Murty  - 15.02** -0.87 15.34**
Dakpo   -   15.02** 1.00 
M. & F.    - 15.34**
D. & F.     - 
Technical inefficiency (TI) 
 Murty Dakpo   M. & F. D. & F.   
Murty  - 17.03* -0.85 16.69** 
Dakpo   - 17.00*    6.22 
M. & F.         -   16.69**
D. & F.          - 
Allocative inefficiency (AI) 
 Murty Dakpo   M. & F. D. & F.   
Murty  - 12.14** -1.00 13.02** 
Dakpo   - 12.08** 1.97 
M. & F.    - 13.02** 
D. & F.     - 
Notes: Murty et al.: (5), Dakpo et al.: (17), Murty et al. & Førsund: (22), Dakpo et al. & Førsund: (26).   
** Denotes statistically significant differences between models at the critical 5 percent level. 
* Denotes statistically significant differences between models at the critical 10 percent level.  
45 
References 
Aigner, D., Lovell, C.A.K. and Schmidt, P. (1977). Formulation and estimation of 
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6(1): 21–37. 
Aparicio, J., Borras, F., Pastor, J. T. and Vidal, F. (2015). Measuring and decomposing 
firm ׳ s revenue and cost efficiency: The Russell measures revisited. International 
Journal of Production Economics, 165, 19–28. 
Aparicio, J., Borras, F., Pastor J.T and Zofío, J.L. (2016a). Loss Distance Functions and 
Profit Function: General Duality Results. In Juan Aparicio, C. A. Knox Lovell and 
Jesus T. Pastor (edts.) Advances in Efficiency and Productivity, Springer: NY, 76–91.  
Aparicio, J., Pastor, J. T. and Vidal, F. (2016b). The weighted additive distance 
function. European Journal of Operational Research, 254(1), 338–346. 
Arjomandi, A., Dakpo, K.H. and Seufert, J.H. (2018). Have Asian airlines caught up with 
European airlines? A by-production efficiency analysis. Transportation Research 
Part A: Policy and Practice, 116: 389–403. 
Ayres, R.U. and Kneese, A.V. (1969). Production, consumption, and externalities. The 
American Economic Review, 59(3): 282–297. 
Ball, V.E., Gollop, F.M., Kelly-Hawke, A. and Swinand, G.P. (1999). Patterns of state 
productivity growth in the U.S. farm sector: Linking state and aggregate models. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81(1): 164–179.  
Ball, V.E., Färe, R., Grosskopf, S. and Nehring, R. (2001). Productivity of the U.S. 
agricultural sector: The case of undesirable outputs. In: New Developments in 
Productivity Analysis (edited by Hulten, C.R., Dean, E.R. and Harper, M.J.), pages 
541–586. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Ball, E., Färe R., Grosskopf, S. and Zaim, O. (2005). Accounting for externalities in the 
measurement of productivity growth: the Malmquist cost productivity measure. 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 16: 374–394.  
Banker, R.D., Charnes, A. and Cooper, W.W. (1984). Some models for estimating 
technical and scale inefficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis. Management 
Science, 30(9): 1078–1092. 
Brännlund, R., Färe, R. and Grosskopf, S. (1995). Environmental regulation and 
profitability: an application to Swedish pulp and paper mills. Environmental and 
resource Economics, 6(1): 23–36. 
California Cap and Trade Program. Prices of CO2. http://calcarbondash.org/.  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services. Environmental Public Health Tracking Network. Pesticide Exposures. 
Accessed from Environmental Public Health Tracking Network: 
www.cdc.gov/ephtracking 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W. and Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision 
making units. European Journal of Operational Research, 2(6): 429–444. 
Chambers, R. G., Chung, Y. and Färe, R. (1998). Profit, Directional Distance Functions, 
and Nerlovian Efficiency. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 98:2, 
351–64. 
Coelli, T.J., Lauwers, L. and Van Huylenbroeck, G., 2007. Environmental efficiency 
measurement and the materials balance condition. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 
28: 3–12. 
Cuesta, Rafael, C.A. Knox Lovell and José L. Zofío (2009). Environmental Efficiency 
Measurement with Translog Distance Functions. Ecological Economics, 68: 2232–
2242. 
Dakpo, K.H. (2016). On modeling pollution-generating technologies: a new formulation 
of the by-production approach. Working Papers 245191, Institut National de la 
46 
recherche Agronomique (INRA), Departement Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et 
Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2). 
Dakpo, K.H., Jeanneaux, P. and Latruffe, L. (2016). Modeling pollution-generating 
technologies in performance benchmarking: Recent developments, limits and future 
prospects in the nonparametric framework. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 250: 347–359. 
Dakpo, K.H., Jeanneaux, P. and Latruffe, L. (2017). Greenhouse gas emissions and 
efficiency in French sheep meat farming: A nonparametric framework of pollution 
adjusted technologies. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 44: 33–65. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S. and Lovell, C.A.K. (1985) The Measurement of Efficiency of 
Production. Kluwer Nijhof Publishing. 
Färe R., Grosskopf S. and Pasurka C. (1986). Effects on relative efficiency in electric 
power generation due to environmental controls. Resources and Energy, 8: 167–184.   
Färe R., Grosskopf S., Lovell, C.A.K. and Pasurka, C. (1989). Multilateral productivity 
comparisons when some outputs are undesirable: A nonparametric approach. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 71: 90–98. 
Färe R., Grosskopf, S. and Weber, W.L. (2006). Shadow prices and pollution costs in 
U.S. agriculture. Ecological Economics, 56: 89–103.  
Färe R., Grosskopf, S., Noh, D.-W. and Weber, W. (2005). Characteristics of a polluting 
technology: theory and practice. Journal of Econometrics, 126: 469–492.  
Färe, R. and Grosskopf, S. (2003). Nonparametric productivity analysis with undesirable 
outputs: Comment. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(4): 1070–74. 
Frisch, R. (1965). Theory of production. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht. 
Førsund, F.R. (2009). Good modeling of bad outputs: Pollution and multiple-output 
production. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 3: 1–
38. 
Førsund, F.R. (2018). Multi-equation modelling of desirable and undesirable outputs 
satisfying the materials balance. Empirical Economics, 54(1): 67–99.  
Hailu, A. (2003). Nonparametric productivity analysis with undesirable outputs: Reply.  
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(4): 1075–77. 
Hailu, A. and Veeman, T.S. (2001). Non-parametric productivity analysis with 
undesirable outputs: An application to the Canadian pulp and paper industry. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83: 605–616.  
Hampf, B. and Rødseth, K.L. (2015). Carbon dioxide emission standards for U.S. power 
plants: An efficiency analysis perspective. Energy Economics, 50: 140–153.  
Haynes, K.E., Ratick, S., Bowen, W.M. and Cummings-Saxton, J. (1993). Environmental 
decision models: U.S. experience and new approaches to pollution management. 
Environment International, 19: 261–275. 
Hoang, V.-N. and Alauddin, M. (2012). Input-orientated Data Envelopment Analysis 
framework for measuring and decomposing economic, environmental and ecological 
efficiency: An Application to OECD agriculture. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 51: 431–452. 
Hoang, V.-N. and Rao, D.S.P. (2010). Measuring and decomposing sustainable efficiency 
in agricultural production: A cumulative exergy balance approach. Ecological 
Economics, 69:9, 1765–1776. 
Huffman, W.E. and Evenson, R.E. (2006). Do formula or competitive grant funds have 
greater impacts on state agricultural productivity. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 88(4): 783–798.  
Kellog, R.L., Nehring, R.F., Grube, A., Goss, D.W. and Plotkin, S. (2002). Environmental 
indicators of pesticide leaching and runoff from farm fields. In Agricultural 
47 
Productivity: Measurement and Sources of Growth, edited by Ball, V.E. and Norton, 
G.W., pages 213-256. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston/Dordrecht/London.   
Korhonen P.J. and Luptacik M. (2004). Eco-efficiency analysis of power plants: An 
extension of data envelopment analysis. European Journal of Operational Research, 
154: 437–446.  
Kuosmanen, T. and Kortelainen, M. (2005). Measuring eco-efficiency of production with 
data envelopment analysis. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 9(4): 59–72. 
Lauwers L. (2009). Justifying the incorporation of the materials balance principle into 
frontier-based eco-efficiency models. Ecological Economics, 68: 1605–1614.  
Lauwers, L.H. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2003). Materials balance based modelling of 
environmental efficiency. Contributed paper selected for presentation at the 25th 
International Conference of Agricultural Economists, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, 
South Africa. 
Li, Q. (1996). Nonparametric testing of closeness between two unknown distribution 
functions. Econometric Reviews, 15: 261–274. 
Lozano, S. (2015). A joint-inputs network DEA approach to production and pollution-
generating technologies. Expert Systems with Applications, 42: 7960–7968.   
Mahlberg, B. and Sahoo, B.K. (2011). Radial and non-radial decompositions of 
Luenberger productivity indicator with an illustrative application. International 
Journal of Production Economics, 131: 721–726. 
Murty, S. and Russell, R.R. (2002). On modeling pollution-generating technologies, 
Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, Discussion Papers 
Series, No. 02-14, 2002. 
Murty, S., Russell, R.R. and Levkoff, S.B. (2012). On modeling pollution-generating 
technologies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 64: 117–135. 
Murty, S. and Russell, R.R. (2018). Modeling emission-generating technologies: 
reconciliation of axiomatic and by-production approaches. Empirical Economics, 
54(1): 7–30. 
Nguyen, T.T., Hoang, V.-N. and Seo, B. (2012). Cost and environmental efficiency of 
rice farms in South Korea. Agricultural Economics, 43: 369–378.  
Pearce, D., Cline, W., Achanta, A., Fankhauser, S., Pachauri, R., Tol, R., and Vellinga, 
P. (1996).The social cost of climate change: greenhouse damage and the benefits of 
control, in Bruce, J., Lee, H., and Haites, E. (eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic 
and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
179–224. 
Pérez Urdiales, M., Oude Lansink, A. and Wall, A. (2016). Eco-efficiency among dairy 
farmers: The importance of socio-economic characteristics and farmer attitudes. 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 64(4): 559–574.  
Pham, M.D. and Zelenyuk, V. (2018). Slack-based directional distance function in the 
presence of bad outputs: Theory and application to Vietnamese banking. Empirical 
Economics, 54: 153–187.  
Picazo-Tadeo, A. J., Gómez-Limón, J. A. and Reig-Martínez, E. (2011). Assessing 
farming eco-efficiency: a data envelopment analysis approach. Journal of 
Environmental Management, 92: 1154–1164. 
Pimentel (2005). Environmental and economic costs of the application of pesticides 
primarily in the United States. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 7: 229–
252. 
Pittman, R.W. (1983). Multilateral productivity comparisons with undesirable outputs. 
The Economic Journal, 93: 391–883. 
48 
Ray, S.C. (2004). Data envelopment analysis: theory and techniques for economics and 
operations research. Cambridge University Press. 
Ray, S.C., Mukherjee, K. and Venkatesh, A. (2018). Nonparametric measures of 
efficiency in the presence of undesirable outputs: a by-production approach. 
Empirical Economics, 54(1): 31–65.  
Reinhard, S., Lovell, C.A.K. and Thijssen, G.J. (1999). Econometric estimation of 
technical and environmental efficiency: An application to Dutch dairy farms. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81: 44–60.  
Reinhard, S., Lovell, C.A.K. and Thijssen, G.J. (2000). Environmental efficiency with 
multiple environmentally detrimental variables; estimated with SFA and DEA. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 121: 287–303. 
Sabasi, D. and Shumway, C.R. (2018). Climate change, health care access and regional 
influence on components of U.S. agricultural productivity. Applied Economics, 50: 
6149–6164.  
Serra, T., Chambers, R.G. and Oude Lansink, A. (2014). Measuring technical and 
environmental efficiency in a state-contingent technology. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 236: 706–717. 
Sheather, S. and Jones, M. (1991). A reliable data-based bandwidth selection method for 
kernel density estimation. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B, 53: 683–
690. 
Shumway, C.R., Fraumeni, B.M., Fulginiti, L.E., Samuels, J.D. and Stefanou, S.E. 
(2015). Measurment of U.S. agricultural productivity: A 2014 review of current 
statistics and proposals for change. Working paper series WP 2015-12. School of 
Economic Sciences. Washigton State University.   
Shumway, C.R., Fraumeni, B.M., Fulginiti, L.E., Samuels, J.D. and Stefanou, S.E. 
(2016). U.S. agricultural productivity: A review of USDA Economic Research 
Service methods. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 38(1): 1–29. 
Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. London: 
Chapman and Hall. 
Simar, L. and Zelenyuk, V. (2006). On testing equality of distributions of technical 
efficiency scores. Econometric Reviews, 25(4): 497–522.  
Skinner, J.A., Lewis, K.A., Bardon, K.S., Tucker, P., Catt, J.A. and Chambers, B.J. 
(1997). An overview of the environmental impact of agriculture in the U.K. Journal 
of Environmental Management, 50(2): 111–128.    
Tyteca, D. (1996) On the measurement of the environmental performance of firms—A 
literature review and a productive efficiency perspective. Journal of Environmental 
Management, 46, 281–308. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Consumer price index and price index for medical 
services. https://www.bls.gov/ 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Census of Agriculture. 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/AgCensus/ 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Economic Research Service (ERS). Data on Agricultural 
Productivity in the U.S. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-
productivity-in-the-us/ 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Greenhouse gas inventory. 
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/inventoryexplorer/ 
Welch, E. and Barnum, D. (2009). Joint environmental and cost efficiency analysis of 
electricity generation. Ecological Economics, 68: 2336–2343. 
Zofío, J.L., Knox Lovell, C.A. 2001. Graph efficiency and productivity measures: an 
application to US agriculture. Applied Economics, 33(11): 1433–1442. 
